Sangshak 80 Countdown — Part 5

By John Gerring

Editorial Foreword

This March sees the 80^th anniversary of the Battle of Sangshak. Probably the least talked-about battle by a British parachute brigade: the 50^th Indian Parachute Brigade. It is a tale of Arnhem, D-Day and North Africa rolled into one, fought by British, Indian and Nepalese soldiers, in a forgotten battle that turned the tide in the battles for Imphal and Kohima and saved Lt General William Slim’s 14th Army from potential defeat. It is a tale of dogged determination in the face of overwhelming odds and a withdrawal like no other. This is the fifth of several posts during March about the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade and the Battle of Sangshak.

Part 5 – The Battle of Sangshak

Under Lieutenant General Slim, the concept of the ‘defensive box’ was developed. The idea was that in the face of a Japanese attack, the British would withdraw into a pre-prepared defensive box from which they would fight the Japanese, the troops within the box being resupplied by air.

This was to counter the Japanese doctrine – to attack quickly, move around obstacles and obtain their supplies by overrunning the British supply depots. A defensive box relied heavily on pre-preparation – buildings, trenches, barbed wire, supporting arcs of fire and pre-prepared plans.

Although Sangshak is often referred to as a box, in the context of Slim’s Fourteenth Army it was not a pre-prepared defensive box. After all, as we have seen, nobody was expecting such a large enemy force to come that way.

Sangshak was simply chosen as the best place to counter the unfolding situation. Perhaps the greatest deficit for the Sangshak Box was the absence of barbed wire; the whole perimeter was consequently open to Japanese incursions.

Around midday on 21^st March 1944, orders were received and given to concentrate the Brigade at Sangshak. Over the next twenty-four hours or so, the disparate British elements made their way to Sangshak through what was now an area crawling with Japanese troops heading west towards the Imphal-Kohima Road.

There were insufficient troops available to Brigadier Hope-Thompson to occupy both hills. The Brigade diary records: “Lack of picks and shovels hindered speedy and extensive digging in but a perimeter was occupied before darkness.”.

Some small actions were fought and during the night there was limited Japanese patrol activity, with a lot of firing from those elements already in the perimeter.

Sangshak consisted of two hard rocky outcrops — West Hill and East Hill — with a small depression in between. East Hill had the highest point, dominated by a small church. By the end of 22^nd March, 50^th Indian Parachute Brigade were ‘dug in’ on East Hill. The diary does not mention that soil in some places was only three feet deep before bedrock was hit, resulting in some very shallow trenches!

The ORBAT and dispositions (see map) by the end of 22^nd March were now: Brigade HQ, Signals and Defence Platoon (in the central depression); 152 Indian Parachute Battalion less C Company (to the NW corner with the 15 Mountain Battery’s OP established in the church); 153 Gurkha Parachute Battalion less S Coy (SW perimeter); 4/5 Mahratta Light Infantry (SE perimeter): Khali Bahadur Regiment less two companies (NW perimeter).

15 Mountain Battery was set up in the central depression with 582 Jungle Mortar Battery. 80 Parachute Field Ambulance less one section was initially in the SE corner before moving to the east. A detachment of 74 Field Company was on the southern perimeter. The Medium Machine Gun Company was dispersed to support as necessary.

On 23^rd March, the Japanese began to lay siege to Sangshak in earnest. Japanese forces had now occupied West Hill. The Japanese 58^th Regiment’s 3^rd Bn threw wave after wave of assaults at the Gurkhas of 153 Bn in the south west corner.

Aided by support from the MMG Coy and the 582 Jungle Mortar Bty, the Japanese attacks were repulsed. A Japanese attack in the south-east against the 4/5 MLI was repulsed. The Japanese also attacked the 15 Mountain Bty position in the north of the perimeter. Again this attack was driven off.

Before dawn, the Japanese withdrew back onto West Hill and into the surrounding jungle. As dawn broke, sniping and firing on fixed lines from the Japanese became the order of the day, taking its toll particularly on the men of the 152 Parachute Bn in the NW corner. It was not all one-way traffic: the guns of the 15 Mountain Battery under Captain John Lock dropping several shells on enemy targets.

Despite the  Japanese sniping, the day was spent improving positions and dispositions. Sangshak’s only potable water supply was just outside the perimeter to the north-west. This was to become a problem as the battle raged. Water was rationed to one bottle per man per day.

Ammunition was urgently needed. A resupply was called in to bring water, ammunition and food. Unfortunately, just like Arnhem, much of the supply fell outside such a small perimeter into the welcome arms of the Japanese.

The Brigade diary records that the “aircraft flew too fast and too high” but accounts also relate that a single aircraft flew low and slow over the British positions in multiple passes dispatching much-needed supplies.

23^rd/24^th March was a ‘quiet night’ with only a single attack by the Japanese on the Khali Bahadur positions to the north-east. This attack was repulsed with mortar support. The Japanese had now attacked every part of the British perimeter and not found the defences wanting.

Harry Seaman noted that  “fatigue and hunger showed in every face”. A second resupply drop of water, food and ammunition was requested. This occurred at 0930  hrs with, frustratingly, the same results as the previous supply drop.

In the best traditions of The Parachute Regiment, Brigadier Hope-Thomson wanted to take the fight to the Japanese and planned an assault on West Hill. He needed more intelligence before doing so and several small patrols were despatched to establish the Japanese numbers and dispositions.

Around midday, 15 Mountain Battery’s OP in the church reported 300 to 400 enemy, twenty vehicles and a number of elephants approaching Sangshak. This meant an increase in mortars and 75mm mountain guns for the attackers.

Despite shoots by the 15 Mt Bty disrupting the enemy approach, these Japanese guns were in action by early afternoon, shelling Brigade HQ and the 152 Bn positions.

This was immediately followed by a major Japanese attack on the church area in the 152 Bn sector. Air support was provided by Hurricanes and the attack eventually petered out. But all the time British casualties were mounting and Major Ball, commanding the MMG Coy, was killed.

The Bde Diary records that at 1700 hours, a message was dropped from a Hurricane informing the defenders that the Sangshak position was vital  to the main plan and that arrangements for relief were in progress though this relief could not be carried out for some time.

This was immediately followed by another Japanese assault on the 152 Parachute Bn positions. Smaller diversionary attacks were also made on the 153 Gurkhas in the south-west corner and on the 4/5 MLI in the south-east corner.

It was, however, clear that the Japanese had chosen the high ground of the church area as their objective. Wave after wave of Japanese infantry assaulted the church between 1600 hours and midnight. The 152 Parachute Bn defended doggedly.

At one point the Japanese occupied the church only to be driven out again. For this engagement Havildar Mohammed Ali and Lt Alan Cowell were awarded, respectively, the Military Medal and the Military Cross.

At 0030 hours on 25^th March, the Japanese attacks on the 152 Bn and church recommenced. The battalion diary records: “all ranks were now suffering from lack of sleep and were feeling the shortage of water. Water was rationed to half a bottle per day.”.

The Brigade diary records another day of relentless fighting in the 152 Bn and church sector. Around 1830 the Japanese were again attacking the 152 Bn positions, now slightly back from the church, which had to be abandoned at first light due to the dwindling numbers of men available to defend it and the relentless onslaught of Japanese infantry. Several resupply drops came in that day but with similar results to the previous drops.

The events of 26^th March are too numerous and too confused to recount in this article. It was another day of relentless attacking by the Japanese, who were now joined by fresh troops from the 60^th Regiment. Attacks were put in on all fronts.

At 0830 that morning Hope-Thompson sent a message to Divisional HQ: “…if strong enemy attacks are sustained on the vital plateau posn, it is unlikely that it could hold out for another two hours.”. And yet, hold it did for the rest of the day.

At 18:00 hours came the message that has become as synonymous with Sangshak as the other famous WW2 Parachute Regiment message ‘Out of ammunition God Save the King’ is with Arnhem: “Fight Your Way Out. Go south and then west. Air and transport on the lookout. Our thoughts are with you.”.

In Part 6, we will look at the withdrawal, the impact of the battle at Sangshak and the issue of who got what in terms of honours for the battle.